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DAVID N. SMITH
Man and Law in Urban Africa: A Role for
Customary Courts in the Urbanization Process
I. INTRODUCTION
Among lawyers concerned with the development process in Africa,
two assumptions are commonly made: (1) that urbanization is a one-
dimensional phenomenon leading inexorably to urbanism on a western
model, and (2) that customary law and customary dispute-settling in-
stitutions have no place in urban Africa.
' The purpose of this paper is to examine these two propositions
in the light of what is known about the processes and problems of
urbanization in Africa. To this end, I shall draw upon the now exten-
sive body of sociological and social anthropological literature that has
grown up over the last two decades concerning urbanization, urbanism
and migration in various African states.' I shall also draw upon the
findings of those who have examined the customary legal process in
homogeneous tribal (rural) areas and suggest how these findings-
which often appear to be of only academic value to those concerned
with developing legal systems-may help in understanding and solv-
ing the plight of the urban African. My primary frame of reference
will be English-speaking West Africa.
It will be my contention that customary courts and customary
law have an indispensable function to perform in the modernization
and urbanization processes. I will try to show that in many situations
they are better adapted than the transplanted English law to meeting
many of the critical problems of adjustment that arise in the transition
from rural to urban environments. I propose to explicate these views
in Part IV of this article. Before doing so, I shall try (in Part II)
to consider why comparatively little attention has been given to the
legal aspects of urbanization in Africa and (in Part III) I shall try to
review the analyses by anthropologists and sociologists of the inter-
DAviD N. SiTu is Secretary, International Legal Studies, Harvard Law
School.
1. Bibliographies may be found in R. Simms, Urbanization in West
Africa: A Review of Current Literature (1965); African Urban Notes (R.
Simms Hamilton, ed. 1966- ); B. Skapa, A Select, Preliminary Bibliography
on Urbanism in Eastern Africa (Maxwell Graduate School Occasional Paper
no. 7, 1967).
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action between traditional African cultures and the process of urban-
ization.
The data on the legal processes in the urban courts of Africa are
clearly inadequate. Aside from Epstein's pioneering work in the
Northern Rhodesian Copperbelt in the 1950's, 2 little attempt has
been made by either lawyers, sociologists, or anthropologists to ex-
amine the dispute-settling processes in Africa's towns and cities or
to examine the role of law in the urbanization process. It will be
suggested here that for those interested in determining the values
and standards retained or adopted by urban dwellers and for those
interested in the institutions available for assisting migrants to the
city in adapting to the urban predicament, the urban courts of Africa
are important subjects of inquiry.
I was led to this study by conclusions I had drawn concerning the
effectiveness of urban customary courts in northern Nigeria after
eighteen months as an inspector of native courts.8 As a "trouble-
shooter" brought into "trouble-cases", I was drawn to those judicial
disputes that were most apt to represent a breakdown in the judicial
process. Yet despite the increased complexity of urban disputes and
the potential uncertainty concerning guidelines of decision-making, I
found that strains within the urban customary court system did not
differ markedly from those experienced by the rural customary courts.
Perhaps more important, I gained the impression that, for certain
types of disputes, the urban customary courts were more effective
than the professional magistrates' courts operating in the same towns.
Much of the current law reform work now going on in Africa 4
takes as its starting point the assumption that customary law and
customary dispute-settling institutions (or processes) are largely rural
phenomena appropriate only for rural needs. It is this assumption
which I wish to bring into question.
A Word on Nomenclature
Before concluding this introduction, I would like to comment on
two matters of nomenclature.
Throughout this article I use the term "customary court" or
"urban customary court" to refer to statutory, generally nonprofes-
sional, courts in which, to use Epstein's characterization, "the cases
are heard and settled within a framework of procedure that [consti-
2. A.L. Epstein, Politics in an Urban African Community (1958).
3. The period was 1963-65. For the colonial and post-independence de-
velopment of these courts see Smith, "Native Courts of Northern Nigeria:
Techniques for Institutional Development," 48 B.U. L. Rev. 49 (1968).
4. See e.g. Zambia, Local Courts Act, no. 20 of 1966; E. Cotran, Restate-
ment of African Law I, Kenya: Marriage and Divorce (1968).
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tutes] a fundamental ingredient of tribal legal systems."'  These
terms refer to courts in which the "primary law of the forum" is cus-
tomary law.6 I distinguish these courts, for analytical purposes, from
"magistrates' courts" which are presided over by professional judges
and which employ "English" procedures and rules of evidence.
This is not to say, of course, that the judges of urban customary
courts may not be highly trained. The judges of the urban "Area"
courts developed for the cities of Kano, Kaduna and Jos in northern
Nigeria in the early 1960's were modern, shrewd, highly skilled men
with considerable experience and training.7 The experience, however,
was native court experience and the training, to the extent it intro-
duced them to Western legal concepts, was essentially supplemental to
this experience. By instinct they were customary court judges at-
tuned to customary law and procedure. The lawyers who staffed
magistrates' courts in the same communities were, by experience
and training, men with quite different legal instincts.
In the states of northern Nigeria, where a parallel system of cus-
tomary courts and magistrates' courts exists, the distinction be-
tween the two types of courts is quite clear in terms of their degree of
professionalism, their procedures, and the primary law of the forum.
In countries where there has been an actual or theoretical integration
of the court systems, the distinction is somewhat blurred. However,
as Antony Allott suggests,
where the former native courts have been transformed into
the lowest grade of magistrates' courts (e.g. Tanganyika,
Kenya), it has. . . been provided that the jurisdiction of these
courts should be limited in some way on the civil side either to
cases governed by customary law or to those which involve
less than a certain amount. . . . In effect, customary law
cases may either have to be brought, or are usually brought,
in these lowest courts; and if a case arises in such courts
which involves questions of the general law, these courts may
be incompetent to deal with them.8
The second question of nomenclature relates to the distinction
between "rural" and "urban" areas. I do not intend to provide, as
a starting point, precise definitions of these terms. For urban plan-
ners, geographers-perhaps even legal translators and generals 9 -the
5. Epstein, supra note 2 at 199.
6. See A. Allott, New Essays in African Law 109-10 (1970).
7. See Smith, supra note 3 at 76-80.
8. Allott, supra note 6 at 110.
9. F.W. Parsons, in his scholarly and stimulating preface to his Hausa
translation of the Penal Code of Northern Nigeria, in commenting on the im-
precision of language and the consequent pitfalls for the legal translator,
notes as an example, that in referring to a collection of habitations,
1972]
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distinction may be crucial. For sociologists, lawyers and others con-
cerned with urbanization, however, the distinction seems less impor-
tant.
This is true despite the fact that some sociologists have felt com-
pelled to pay homage to Redfield's "folk-urban continuum", placing
"folk society" at one extreme and "modern urban society" at the
other.10 In general, such concepts are marginal to sociological anal-
yses. A number of sociologists have clearly rejected the model for
cross-cultural analyses."I
One reason for the limited utility of the folk-urban continuum and
related concepts is that frequently sociologists are, whether this is
clearly articulated or not, more concerned with "urbanization" than
with "urbanism". Epstein has emphasized the utility of regarding ur-
banization "as involving a process of movement and change; its essence
is that it creates the possibility of discontinuity with some pre-existing
set of conditions". 12 Urbanism, in contrast, is "the way of life in the
towns themselves".' 8
As a lawyer concerned with the impact of law on urban Africans,
I am less concerned with urbanism than with "the process of becoming
a townsman",' 4 a process involving change, adjustment, cultural rein-
tegration and the shifting of norms and values.15 This process may
occur in a community the size of Maiduguri (57,000) or in a metro-
politan area the size of Lagos (720,000). It may occur in a traditional
urban community such as Kano or in a new urban community such as
the mining and administrative center of Jos. In law-related terms, I
am interested in the methods by which the African and the dispute-
settling institutions at his disposal resolve the discontinuities between
the African's antecedent and urban environments.
A may call it "a village", B "a town", and neither can be said to be
right or wrong by any generally accepted standard of measurement or
other criterion. Yet this verbal distinction may be of vital significance in
certain circumstances, as was shown during the last war when orders to
evacuate all the "kauyuka" ('villages') in a certain area near Zaria for
an artillery practice were interpreted by the man responsible for carry-
ing them out as excluding one place in his view a gari ('town'), since it
was of some antiquity and had the remains of a wall-with fatal results.
Tsarin Laifuffuka da Hukuncinsu, N.R. 18 ta 1959 at Cl.
10. R. Redfield, The Folk Culture of Yucatan 8 (1938).
11. See critical literature cited in 0. Lewis, Anthropological Essays 53
(1970).
12. A.L. Epstein, "Urbanization and Social Change in Africa," 8 Current
Anthropology 275, 276 (1967).
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. See M. Herskovits, The Human Factor in Changing Africa 266-67
(1962). Change, of course, is not unique to urban Africa. See e.g. M. Gluck-
man: "Most tribal systems have in fact absorbed many changes in their tradi-
tional equilibrium." Politics, Law and Ritual in Tribal Society 322 (1965).
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II. POLARITIES AND MISCONCEPTIONS: MODERNIZATION
AND CUSTOMARY LAW
We may take as a starting point in our analysis the question
why the legal aspects of urbanization in Africa have been given so lit-
tle attention by lawyers and legal anthropologists.
One reason seems to be that in many of the theories constructed
to define modernization, industrialization or urbanization, process and
the intermediate stages of development are given slight attention.
Rather, one is struck by the domination of concepts of polarity: prim-
itive and modern; village and metropolis; status and contract.'0
We may take, for example, the status-contract dichotomy. The
assumption that contract is the "dominant theme" in, say, London and
Paris17 and status the "dominant theme" in Birnin Gwari village in
northern Nigeria, tells us little about what should be of central con-
cern: what are the values and themes characteristic of societies in the
process of change?
Is status or contract the dominant theme in the mining center of
Jos or in the administrative center of Kaduna? The answer would
appear to be neither. The lesson of much of the sociological literature
on African urbanization is that in the urbanization process selection of
values and of personal and institutional arrangements is frequently
"additive and not necessarily substitutive".'8 As Plotnicov informs
us, urban man in Jos follows "pluralistic behavior". 19 Thus while
status may govern a man's familial obligations, his business obliga-
tions may be governed by contract-or a combination of contract and
status. Many of the "choice of law" cases which have long puzzled pro-
fessional judges and legal scholars throughout Africa are simply a re-
flection of the modern African's pluralistic behavior. The reason these
cases are often so difficult to solve is that for many Africans neither
status nor contract is the dominant theme of his existence.
16. Speaking of industrialization, one observer has stated that "legally,
conflicting claims are expressed in contractual rather than status arrange-
ments." Kuper, Introduction, in Kuper (ed.), Urbanization and Migration in
West Africa 1 (1965). Elsewhere status is referred to as the "dominant
theme" of customary legal systems. Seidman, "Law and Development in
Independent, English-Speaking, Sub-Saharan Africa," in Hutchinson (ed.),
Africa and Law 21-22 (1968). See also text accompanying note 10 supra.
17. Such an assumption is probably misleading. Modern employment
contracts and other economic arrangements (such as the seniority system)
often incorporate status concepts which are of considerable significance in
Western society.
18. Herskovits and Bascom, "The Problem of Stability and Change in
African Culture," in Bascom and Herskovits (eds.), Continuity and Change in
African Cultures 6 (1959).
19. L. Plotnicov, Strangers to the City: Urban Man in Jos, Nigeria 295
(1967).
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Abner Cohen, in his study of the kola and cattle trade in Ibadan,
emphasizes the intermixture of contractual and non-contractual rela-
tionships in this trade. He states that the Hausas, who dominate the
seller's market, belong to a "moral community" which impels men to
act in accordance with "intrinsic values and norms, without much con-
sideration for specific gain".20
Models-whether of modernization, industrialization or "develop-
ment"-can be as hazardous as the polarities suggested by "status-con-
tract" and "folk-urban" concepts. Not infrequently, such models ob-
scure intermediate stages; occasionally "modernization" (the process
of becoming modern) is confused with "modernism" (the state of being
modern) .21
In addition, such models run the risk of ethnocentrism. Some law-
yers are still influenced by the evolutionary formulations of turn-of-
the-century sociologists who conceived of all social change as leading
inevitably in one direction. The itemization of the common salient
features of a modern (Western) legal system,22 for example, does not
enlighten us as to whether the legal system of an African state, with
its peculiar social environment, can or should move in a different di-
rection. Speaking of urban sociology, Theodore Caplow argues that
this literature, as well as the literature of urban geography has "a
tendency to project as universals those characteristics of urbanism
with which European and American students are most familiar ...
There was until recently a tendency to ascribe to all cities character-
istics which now appear to be specific to Chicago .... -23
Contributing to the tendency to ignore process and intermediate
range problems is the inclination of some lawyers to view "develop-
ment" needs (and the resulting law jobs) largely in terms of central
planning and industrialization, that is, in terms of what is needed to
bring African societies to the state of Western societies.24 Once this
premise is established, it is argued that the institutions supported by
20. Cohen, "Politics of the Kola Trade," 36 Africa 18, 25 (1966). The
criticism directed against Redfield's "folk-urban continuum" is instructive in
understanding the dangers of polarity. (See supra notes 10 and 11 and ac-
companying text.) Oscar Lewis has written that while such characterizations
as "folk", "rural" and "urban"
are attractive because of their simplicity and may be useful in distin-
guishing gross stages or types of societal evolution, they confuse issues in
the study of short-run changes, and their heuristic value as research
tools has never been proven. Supra note 11 at 54.
21. See Galanter, "The Modernization of Law," in Friedman and Macau-
ley (eds.), Law and the Behavioral Sciences 989 (1969).
22. Ibid.
23. T. Caplow, "The Social Ecology of Guatemala City," 28 Social Forces
113 (1949).
24. See Seidman, supra note 16 at 28-29 and Lipton, Review of M. Gluck-
man (ed.), Ideas and Procedures in African Customary Law (1969) in Africa
Report (March 1971) 32.
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the customary legal system are impediments to development. 25 The
extended family and traditional modes of land "ownership" are cited
as examples by both lawyers and economists.
2 6
Yet recent studies suggest that the extended family in developing
countries may play an important role in both capital accumulation
and the cooperation needed in organizing and operating small busi-
nesses.2 7  Other studies suggest that communal land tenure pat-
terns and fractionized land have not prevented significant growth
rates for export crops in West Africa.28 In terms of social considera-
tions, both the extended family and the rights to land in the rural
homeland may provide a necessary sense of security to the urban
African.29
In brief, the time has come for lawyers to shake off a number of
catch-phrases, models and assumptions which have tended to shape
their thinking about modernization, urbanization and development and
hence their thinking about the role of customary law and courts in
urban Africa.
III. LESSONS FROM THE SOCIOLOGISTS:
RURAL AND URBAN TRIBALISM IN THE CITY
I turn now to what I consider to be basic to an understanding of
the role of customary law and customary courts in urban Africa. This
is an understanding of the urbanization process itself.
Some early3" and some recent 3 studies of urban Africa have em-
phasized the breakdown of the extended family, the conflict of cul-
tural values, the ineffectiveness of moral and legal sanctions and the
rise of crime, prostitution and juvenile delinquency. Andreski's The
African Predicament (subtitled "A Study in the Pathology of Modern-
ization") is, for example, devoted largely to revealing "the all-per-
25. Ibid.
26. See e.g. B. Higgins, Economic Development 256 (1959); A. Kamarack,
The Economics of African Development 50-51 (1967). For helpful commen-
tary, see Dunning, "Land Reform in Ethiopia: A Case Study in Non-Develop-
ment," 18 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 271 (1970).
27. Hirschman, "Obstacles to Development: A Classification and a Quasi-
Vanishing Act," 13 Economic Development and Cultural Change 385-87
(1965). See also P. Lloyd, Africa in Social Change 191 (1967).
28. C. Eicher, Research on Agricultural Development in Five English-
Speaking Countries in West Africa 16 (The Agricultural Development Coun-
cil Inc., 1970).
29. Gluckman, supra note 15 at 329. This is a central theme of William
Watson's Tribal Cohesion in a Money Economy (1958).
30. K.A. Busia, Social Survey of Sekondi-Takoradi (1950); E. Hellman,
Rooiyard: A Social Survey of an Urban Slum Area (Rhodes-Livingstone
Paper no. 13, 1948).
31. See generally S. Andreski, The African Predicament (1968).
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vading element of strife which is so characteristic of large African
towns".
32
While there are data available to support, in part, theories of cul-
tural discontinuities and urban stress, many of the general conclusions
suggesting the existence of "urban jungles" in Africa seem to have
stemmed from an eagerness to read the problems of American and
European post-industrial urban areas into the situations of African
pre-industrial centers.3 3 In some cases the impression of urban stress
and conflict have been fostered by important novels, like Ekwensi's
People of the City.3 4
Plotnicov, in his innovative study of the mining and administrative
center of Jos, Nigeria, argues that the impression develops from a
tendency to view what is an essentially African experience through
Western eyes. While individuals reflect flux and pluralism in their
behavior, "behavior which may look inconsistent or irrational to the
onlooker is logical from the actor's point of view."85
Plotnicov states that the African townsman in Jos shows little
inclination to exercise role consistency: an individual may combine
Christianity with polygamy, modern business practices with ancestor
worship. The most significant aspect of modern African urbanization
at the individual level, Plotnicov argues, is the incorporation, within
a single individual, of Western and traditional goals and forms of be-
havior, each held as distinct and appropriate for specific times and
places.3 6 And, as Plotnicov's and other studies reveal, from the Afri-
can's point of view the old and new often can be ordered-or manipu-
lated-without excessive difficulty.
Indeed, the fact that traditional ties are maintained provides, in
many cases, the very frame of reference needed by urban Africans
to organize their lives. In addition, urban Africans have developed
certain indigenous institutions which assist them further in adapting
to the urban environment. Both of these factors deserve attention
here.
Tribal Ties: Rural and Urban
The central fact of urban life in West African cities is, as P.C.
Lloyd has indicated, that the town dweller "is an immigrant, and that
we are dealing with a perhaps transitional period when these immi-
32. Ibid. 40.
33. This point is made in Lewis, "Urban Crucible: Parallels and Divergen-
cies," Africa Report (May-June, 1969) 62.
34. (1954).
35. Plotnicov, supra note 19 at 294-95.
36. Ibid. 274. Gluckman summarizes the process in this way: "[R]adical
change proceeds as much by multiplication and diversification, in which the
old survives alongside the new, as by substitution of new for old". Gluckman,
supra note 15 at 321.
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grants form a majority of residents. '37 Moreover, a large proportion of
these immigrants have come from tribal homes a relatively short dis-
tance away. "Without modern roads and frequent bus and lorry serv-
ices, they can, without much difficulty, travel home for annual holi-
days or even for week-ends.13  Consequently, town and village dwel-
lers maintain close links with each other.
Lloyd classifies migrants into three basic groups: the seasonal, the
short-staying, and the long-staying.3 9 The seasonal migrants in West,
Africa come predominantly from the savanna region during the dry
season. The short-staying migrants--"target workers"-include indi-
viduals who come to the city for specific purposes: to earn enough
money to purchase a sewing machine or bicycle, to pay taxes, to make
a marriage payment.
Significantly, even many of the long-staying migrants do not in-
tend to remain town dwellers forever. Plotnicov, in his study of urban
man in Jos, Nigeria found that most of his informants "intend" to re-
turn to their rural homes eventually, though few actually do. 40 Nev-
ertheless, many do maintain channels of communication and commerce
with kinsmen in the tribal area.
A number of studies conducted by urban anthropologists and so-
ciologists suggest that even for the "permanent" migrant, the process
of "detribalization" is a slow one. The very term "detribalization",
once current in sociological literature, has fallen into disrepute as
more is learned about the processes of urbanization and adaptation
in African towns and cities.41 . William Lewis, in summarizing the
findings of a number of leading studies on urban Africa, states that
"all of these studies testify to durability of kinship ties among the
first and second generations of immigrants to the growing towns and
urban centers. 42
Fraenkel's research in the late 1950's suggested the transient qual-
ity of Loma residence in Monrovia and the durability of rural asso-
ciations. 43 More recently, Jeanette Carter has analyzed those factors
which tend to tie Monrovians from Loma country to their tribal area:
the rearing of children of urban families by grandparents upcountry;
the payment of bridewealth to the wife's family; the training of female
children in the secret Sande bush schools; friendly visits; the settle-
ment of marital disputes. Of the Monrovia residents who had originally
37. Lloyd, supra note 27 at 113.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid. 109 ff.
40. Plotnicov, supra note 19 at 296-97.
41. See Herskovits, supra note 15 at 287-89. "Terms of this kind, in
actuality, gloss over the complexities of adjustment to the urban setting; for
those engaged in the scientific study of change in Africa they are meaning-
less". (at 289).
42. Lewis, supra note 33 at 63.
43. M. Fraenkel, Tribe and Class in Monrovia (1964).
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come from Zolowo, Lofa county, 76% of those interviewed had been
back to Zolowo within the previous 18 months.44
Carter's findings concerning 'the settlement of marital disputes
are of particular interest:
These disputes often have their origins in the capital and
usually some attempt has been made to resolve the dispute
there. When that fails, however, the couple are likely, espe-
cially if they are both Loma, to return upcountry to their
families to seek a settlement .... The frequency . . .with
which these palavers occur illustrates the extent to which ru-
ral and urban families are linked.45
The retention of traditional practices and allegiances is normally
referred to simply as "tribalism", but the terminology in the present
context is imprecise. As Mitchell has explained, there are, in fact,
two types of "tribalism" in the urban context: rural tribalism and
urban tribalism. 46 The former refers to a social system in which re-
lationships are organized within a peculiar structural and cultural
framework. 47 The latter refers to a means of "classifying a hetero-
geneous urban population into a limited number of meaningful social
categories. '48
It seems clear that both types of tribalism play a role in providing
stability within the urban context. Traditional rural ties with family
and community may provide a frame of reference to which the indi-
vidual can relate back in periods of stress. Urban tribal ties-whether
through tribal associations or other institutions-may provide similar
stability by offering "a guide to behaviour in situations of casual inter-
action amongst relative strangers" and as "the primary badge of
identity". 49
Yet, despite the common function of providing stability and a
frame of reference, the distinctions between urban and rural tribalism
are important in understanding the allegiances and value systems of
urban man in Africa. To the extent that traditional rural ties con-
tinue to exert an influence on African townsmen in the form of fam-
ily or community obligations, the type of law that should apply to the
individual may be affected. On the other hand, the mere fact that
an individual retains a tribal identity and belongs to a tribal associa-
44. Carter, "The Rural Loma and Monrovia: Ties with an Urban Center,"
2 Liberian Studies J. 143, 146 (1970).
45. Ibid. 147.
46. J.C. Mitchell, "The Kalela Dance," in Rhodes-Livingstone Paper no.
27, 1956.
47. An urban dweller's interest in rural land, for example, "involves ac-
ceptance of kinship obligations, and with these of many parts of tribal cul-
ture." Gluckman, supra note 15 at 330-31.
48. Epstein, supra note 12 at 280.
49. Ibid. 280-81.
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tion does not necessarily suggest that disputes in which he is involved
should be influenced by the value system inherent in the rural tribal
situation. The urban tribal connection may suggest, however, that the
urban African has needs-law-related and otherwise-which are not
being served by other institutions. The urban voluntary association
becomes an important focus of inquiry in this regard.
Ethnic Associations-Adjustive, Facilitative and
Quasi-Judicial Roles
The institution most central to the social anthropologist's or so-
ciologist's study of tribalism in urban Africa has been the urban or
"ethnic" association. Indeed, the role of ethnic associations looms so
large in the studies of African urbanization that one wonders what
urban sociologists and anthropologists would have done without them.
For our purposes, the ethnic association is interesting for a num-
ber of reasons: their spontaneous growth as institutions for facilitat-
ing adjustment to the urban environment; the extent to which they
represent ties with the rural sector; and the extent to which they per-
form quasi-judicial functions. Each of these elements is, I believe, sug-
gestive with regard to the type of "dispute-settling" and "judicial"
institutions appropriate for the urban environment.
Kenneth Little's study of voluntary associations in West Africa
reveals four typologies: tribal unions, friendly societies, occupational
groups, and entertainment and recreational associations.50 These group-
ings vary in terms of their emphasis on ethnicity and in their tribal or
traditional ties. Little distinguishes between "traditional societies",
"traditional-modernized groups" and those which are wholly modern
in organization and objective. The associations falling within the first
two categories derive from traditional groupings and practices:
" [t] hey developed various Western procedures and have been adapted
to modern purposes, but their mainspring is indigenous". 51
It is the "traditional" and "traditional-modern" associations which
are of most interest here. To the extent that the traditional associa-
tions provide the migrant with a home away from home and reinforce
or maintain rural ties, they foster a value system closely akin to that
of the rural community. On the other hand, to the extent that the
traditional-modern association attempts to adapt rural patterns of
behavior to town life, they help to create a new syncretic value sys-
tem which is neither wholly rural nor wholly urban.
Speaking of the former, Little states that having belonged to a
compact group of kinsmen and neighbors, the migrant turns to sim-
ilar patterns of communal living in the city. He "prefers to remain
50. K. Little, West African Urbanization (1965).
51. Ibid. 66.
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as far as possible in the company of previous associates. The result
is that instead of weakening tribal consciousness, life in the new urban
environment tends in some respects to make it stronger. '52
The traditional-modern association represents a later phase in the
individual's urbanization process. Little describes how this associa-
tion serves as an "adaptive mechanism" in relation to modern institu-
tions:
[I] t helps to adjust the rural migrant to his fresh status
as a townsman, as a member of a multitribal community, as a
breadwinner and as a partner in a monogamous marriage.
Further, since they help to establish and validate fresh norms
and exercise control over the personal conduct of their own
members, voluntary associations are one of the means whereby
an over-all system of relationships is integrated and law and
order maintained among the town's heterogeneous popula-
tion.53
The law-related roles of urban voluntary associations present, for
our purposes, one of the most significant aspects of the adaptive func-
tion of these associations. A number of such associations have been
found to assume functions often performed by customary courts or
traditional legal institutions in the rural areas. The spontaneous
growth of ethnic associations and their spontaneous assumption of
these functions suggests that urban governments within a number of
African states may have failed to provide viable alternative institu-
tions acceptable to the urban African.
Epstein defines a community's "civic structure" as one of the de-
terminants of the community's social structure and suggests that tri-
bal associations appear to play a dispute-settling role in those situa-
tions where there are no tribal headmen (or other traditional institu-
tion) to perform this function. He compares the role of ethnic
associations in this regard to the role played by tribal elders on the
Copperbelt and in the tribal area of Freetown. 54
Schwab has criticized Epstein's formulation on the basis that in
some areas-among the Yoruba, for example-ethnic associations have
existed in communities where there have been "urban courts" and a
"highly developed indigenous leadership".55 Schwab does not, how-
ever, distinguish between "customary" urban courts and those urban
magistrates' courts fashioned on Western models. The distinction is
crucial since the law to be applied and the values articulated may
differ significantly depending on the court. Lloyd recognizes the
52. Ibid. 24.
53. Ibid. 102.
54. Epstein, supra note 12 at 281.
55. Schwab, Comment on Epstein, supra note 12, in 8 Current Anthro-
pology 290-91 (1967).
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problem when, in commenting on the dispute-settling role of ethnic
associations he notes that "the [association] members [are] anxious
to keep their disputes away from the urban police and courts (which
may employ alien concepts of law in resolving them) . .. "56 The
voluntary association, then, may serve as a buffer between the indi-
vidual and the professional courts. 67
The adoption of dispute-settling and other quasi-judicial functions
by urban associations has not been fully documented, and further in-
vestigation is needed. What evidence is available suggests that these
associations frequently undertake dispute-settling and other quasi-ju-
dicial functions similar to functions exercised by customary courts,
kinship groups and village headmen in the rural areas.
Lloyd states that on the death of a townsman, the officers of an
ethnic association will frequently act as executors of the deceased's
estate, "listing his property and sending a statement to the elders
of his descent group in the village so that his assets may be dis-
tributed in the customary manner and not taken by unentitled persons
living in the town."58 Little states that the urban guild "protects the
customer against the craftsman who receives an advance payment for
his work and then fails, without good reason, to complete the contract
and is unable to refund the money." 59
With regard to the settlement of disputes, it is not unusual for
the ethnic associations [to] apply the customary law of their
home areas. They are themselves anxious to preserve the
reputations of their own ethnic groups and will take strong
measures to prevent any member from damaging them by
theft or drunkenness. The small number of police stationed in
a Nigerian town reflects, in part, the success of the ethnic asso-
ciations as agents of social control.6 0
In Eastern Nigeria the Social Welfare Department has adopted the
practice of handing over juvenile delinquents, caught in theft or oth-
erwise, to the elders of appropriate ethnic associations." Rogoff, in a
study of crime and urbanization in Kenya, emphasizes the role of urban
associations as one factor in the steady decline in the rate of reported
crimes during the period 1957-65.62
56. Lloyd, supra note 27 at 199.
57. Offodile cites the case of the Ibo union in Makurdi which decreed that
members shall not take legal steps without first bringing the matter before
the association. The regulation was so effective that "Ibo people entirely de-
serted the courts except when drawn there by members of different tribes.
... " "Growth and Influence of Tribal Unions," 18 West African Rev. (1947).
58. Lloyd, supra note 27 at 198-99.
59. Little, supra note 50 at 92.
60. Lloyd, supra note 27 at 199.
61. Ibid. 199-200.
62. Rogoff, "The Criminal and Urbanization," 45 E. African Medical J.
341 (1968).
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The spontaneous growth of tribal associations in urban Africa and
their assumption of law-related functions where acceptable alterna-
tive institutions have not been available closely parallels the spon-
taneous growth of urban "mixed" courts in northern Nigeria in the
1940's. The mixed court history helps, I think, to put the quasi-judi-
cial role of voluntary associations in perspective.
Mr. Justice Brooke, in his 1952 report inquiring into the develop-
ment and future of customary courts in northern Nigeria, noted that
in the urban centers of Kano, Zaria and Kaduna the mixed courts were
created by individuals from the Southern Provinces who were resident
in the "strangers' quarters" of these towns. Initially, these "stran-
gers" used the English-type magistrates' courts, but this proved un-
successful:
They were removed from their tribal sanctions, [had] im-
ported customs of their own and desired their own courts. The
first "court" [in each of the three towns] adjudicated without
statutory authority and was closed down, but there was a need
for some authority to which they could submit their disputes
and eventually the mixed court evolved, [having taken] the
place of the unauthorized court [s] which had continued to
function without the sanction or knowledge of the authorities
as . . . arbitrational tribunal [s]. [The mixed court] was re-
ported to function in a practical and useful manner.
6 3
Banton, in his 1957 study of tribal life in Freetown, records a
similar development. He notes that tribal headmen, though explicitly
excluded by ordinance from exercising criminal and civil jurisdiction,
perform many functions for which the law does not provide.
In particular, they hold courts which are strictly illegal but
which are supported by the people because they feel the need
for some means of settling disputes in the manner to which
they have become accustomed.
6 4
Also instructive-particularly since it involves an important eco-
nomic activity-is Abner Cohen's study of the organization of credit
in the Ibadan cattle market.65 Some 75,000 head of cattle are sold
each year in this market. The herds are collected by Hausa dealers
from semi-nomadic Fulani in the North and brought to Ibadan to be
sold with the help of Hausa middlemen to Yoruba butchers. All sales
are on credit (despite the tribal differences). "No documents are
signed and no resort is made to the services of banks or to the official
civil courts. . ". ."6 The Hausa Chief of the Market in Ibadan serves
63. Brooke, Report of the Native Courts Commission of Inquiry-Appen-
dix and Summary 82 (1952).
64. M. Banton, West African City 216 (1957). See also 144-58.
65. Cohen, "The Social Organization of Credit in a West African Cattle
Market," 35 Africa 8 (1965).
66. Ibid. 8-9.
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as adjudicator in the cases of disputes. The dealers and middlemen
are reluctant to submit disputes with the butchers to the civil courts
for several reasons: the amount due to each dealer is small, com-
pared to the expense of adjudication; court procedure is long and
dealers from the North cannot wait in Ibadan indefinitely; there is
a general feeling that court rulings are not "effective". Arbitration
by the Chief of the Market, on the other hand, is "prompt, convenient,
and effective. It is performed by a Hausa, but in nearly all cases of
dispute, the Chief of the Butchers, a Yoruba, participates in the arbi-
tratory [sic] process. The ruling of the Chief of the Market is final
and is nearly always honoured. ' ' 67
Each of these cases, as well as the assumption of quasi-judicial
functions by voluntary associations, represents an instance of indi-
viduals and groups in urban situations turning to non-official agencies
for dispute-settlement and other legal matters because the official
agencies, for one reason or another, are not acceptable.
IV. URAN CUSTOMARY COURTS: TRADITIONAL PROCESSES
AND THE CREATION OF URBAN CUSTOMARY LAW
A number of reasons could be suggested for the emergence of
customary mixed courts in northern Nigeria, the assumption of extra-
legal judicial powers by headmen in Freetown and Ibadan, and the
assumption of quasi-judicial powers by tribal associations in urban
Africa: the familiarity of customary courts and institutions to re-
cently arrived immigrants, distrust of lawyers and professional judges,
the belief that professional courts, as Lloyd phrases it, will apply
"alien concepts".68
These concerns may all, to varying degrees, argue for customary
courts in Africa. But they are not, I think, the most central considera-
tions. Nor are they the most acceptable for a state in the process of
modernization. A distrust of "things modern" is not, by itself, a sound
basis for preserving traditional institutions.
What I wish to propose here is quite different. It is that, given
the extent of rural-urban ties in Africa and the pluralistic behavior
patterns of the African townsman, the processes of customary court
dispute-settlement and the nature of customary law may be peculiarly
well-suited to solving many of the legal and social (adjustment) prob-
lems encountered by individuals involved in the transition from rural
to urban environments. In brief, customary courts and customary
law may be important links in the modernization and urbanization
processes.
67. Ibid. 18-19.
68. Lloyd, supra note 27 at 199.
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Pursuing the comparison suggested by the similarities between
urban associations and the mixed courts, it is the functions of the "tra-
ditional-modern" associations rather than the "traditional" associa-
tions which provide analogues to the functions which I believe might
be played by urban customary courts. It is as a forward-looking,
rather than a backward-looking, institution that I think the urban
customary court can play an important role in facilitating the tran-
sition of individuals to the urban sector.
An understanding of the role of customary courts and customary
law in the urban environment may perhaps best be examined in the
light of the choice of law problems which plague urban magistrates'
courts in Africa. These problems are basically of two sorts: (1)
those arising from litigation involving persons from two different
tribes where the tribal laws may appear to "conflict", and (2) those
arising from litigation involving, in its simplest form, one individual
where the question is whether his situation should be governed by
his traditional tribal law or by the imported "English" law which he
may be deemed to have accepted by his mode of life.6 9
Cases involving aspects of these two basic themes are often diffi-
cult to resolve. Indeed, because of the difficulty, many lawyers have
called for the abolition of pluralistic legal systems in Africa. Allott
states, for example, that
[c]hoice of law problems . . . will remain until such time as
pluralism in the relevant parts of the national legal system
has been eliminated. . . . Choice of law problems will . . .
remain to puzzle the courts and legal advisers, and some of
the complexities . . . may well be the strongest arguments in
favour of unification. 70
For one experienced with the customary courts of Africa, the
conflict of laws puzzle-and the fact that Allott, in his New Essays in
African Law,71 devotes 231 of the book's 338 pages to problems of
"internal conflict of laws"-seems strange. Despite the fact that ur-
ban customary courts deal with litigants from mixed backgrounds
(both in terms of tribe and mode of life), true "conflict of laws" prob-
lems seem seldom to arise in those courts.
Yet it cannot be denied that such problems are significant in the
urban magistrates' courts. The interesting question is why such
problems do emerge in urban magistrates' courts and not in urban
customary courts, given the fact that in a great range of cases the indi-
69. There are several variations on both themes. See A. Allott, New Es-
says in African Law 108-09 (1970).
70. Ibid. 111. See also Cole, "The Administration of the Law," in Fyfe and
Jones (eds.), Freetown: A Symposium 175-76 (1968), and Seidman, supra
note 16 at 29.
71. Supra note 69.
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viduals appearing before both courts have similar backgrounds and
problems.
Elsewhere I have observed, with regard to the "mixed" courts
of Northern Nigeria, that the value of these urban customary courts
lies less in their ability to solve legal conflicts according to strict
legal precepts than in their ability merely to provide solutions to
problems that come before them.7 2 Conflicts of "laws" or "customs"
are resolved through techniques of persuasion and compromise.
But this is clearly not the whole story. Put more meaningfully, it
is the processes of dispute settlement which form the critical distinction
between customary and magistrates' courts and which lead to differ-
ent resolutions of conflict of laws problems. This distinction has been
described effectively by Epstein in his study of urban courts in the
Copperbelt of Northern Rhodesia.13 He argues that the operation and
development of conflict of laws rules is only made possible by a mode
of procedure in which pleading has become a technical and refined art.
In the magistrates' court "the conflict of law is set out immediately
in the pleas of the respective parties, and legal argument follows on
what law ought to govern the dispute". In the customary court, the
procedure is quite different:
Litigants in an Urban [customary] Court rarely speak
about the law; they address themselves to the "facts", leaving
it to the court to decide whether the "facts" disclose a cause
of action and what the appropriate remedy should be.
74
Moreover, the customary court is concerned "with social rela-
tionships rather than with right-and-duty-bearing units, which form
the core of English legal procedure". 75 The customary court thus
"deals with patterns of rightdoing and wrongdoing within the con-
text of a given social relationship, rather than with the enforcement of
specific legal rights and duties."
76
In addition, it seems likely that the magistrates' courts, with their
peculiar rule orientation, are apt to find conflict problems where they
do not in fact exist-or where, at least, they can be avoided. Bentsi-
Enchill suggests that typical "conflicts" disputes involving occupation,
possession or ownership of land, or concerning the dissolution of
marriage or defamation or seduction do not generally involve a con-
frontation of different bodies of law and custom at the points where
their differences are material. An inspection of different bodies of
law and custom and the policies behind them "reveals wide areas of
identity and sympathy, providing a basis for the characteristic meth-
72. Smith, supra note 3 at 77.
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ods of judicial elaboration of principles to apply to novel issues so
characteristic of the common law. '77
Those who call for the unification of legal systems because of the
difficulty presented by choice of law problems reach this conclusion
because of the Western-trained lawyer's affinity for rules and for pro-
fessional courts. They start with the proposition that customary rules,
as administered in magistrates' courts, do not work. Consequently,
the customary legal system, including customary law and customary
courts, must be abolished. But if we start from the point of view of
customary law as administered in customary courts and break away
from our traditional rule-orientation,7 8 the resolution of "conflict of
laws" problems appears in a new light.
My own experience with the customary courts of Northern Ni-
geria in the period 1963-65 suggests that, with regard to choice of law
problems, the medium is the message. In the mixed courts (which
heard disputes between litigants of different tribes) one would have
expected "rules of law" to have been clearly articulated since pre-
sumably, in a mixed case, each litigant carried with him his own tribal
law and some resolution of the conflict between the two laws was nec-
essary. But not only did one not find choice of law rules for resolving
such conflicts, one seldom encountered a situation where rule was
pitted against rule. The courts tended to begin with fact, rather than
rule, determination. It was in the process of fact-statement that the
values and moral beacons which ultimately served as the guideposts
of decision-making emerged.
Epstein has documented this process and the avoidance of con-
flicts of laws in the Copperbelt of Northern Rhodesia. He states that
Lozi and Bemba may differ, for example, in their modes of
contracting a marriage and in the legal incidents which at-
tach to such a union, but they are in complete agreement that
mutual respect, aid and cooperation are among the supreme
values of the new relationship created. And because the Ur-
ban [customary] Court is primarily concerned with these su-
preme values, it becomes possible for the majority of disputes
to be settled by methods which are traditional, yet involve no
reference to any particular system of tribal law.7 9
In cases where litigants are from two tribes, the result may be
the development of an urban common law growing out of the cus-
77. Bentsi-Enchill, "The Colonial Heritage of Legal Pluralism," 1 Zambia
L.J. 1, 25 (1969). See also Epstein, supra note 2: "[W]hile there are diver-
gent tribal customs their existence does not markedly affect the broad uni-
formity of legal rule and doctrine as between different tribes." (at 213).
78. See Abel, "Customary Law of Wrongs in Kenya," 17 Am. J. Comp.
L. 573, 614 (1969).
79. Epstein, supra note 2 at 215.
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tomary laws. The evidence suggests that the urban customary courts
are developing modern customary laws reflective of the emerging
social values and norms of the urban environment. Epstein has demon-
strated that the Urban (customary) Court members of the Copperbelt
import into their judgments "their experience of the whole way-of-life
of the people-their habits and customs, their ethical code and system
of knowledge."80  This experience includes the urban Copperbelt as
well as tribal areas. "Thus new customs can be recognized, or changes
introduced in the law .... ,,"1 Pauwels and Crabb suggest a similar
development in Kinshasa. s 2 It is a customary law developing out of the
new urban situation, of territorial rather than of tribal inspiration.
Yet it depends on the traditional processes of the customary courts for
its nourishment and acceptance.
Banton, in his study of tribal life in Freetown, states that the
headmen and elders who sit in the extra-legal customary courts in
Freetown "arrive at their decisions in the light of the realities of tribal
life in the city and are willing to depart from strict traditional stand-
ards. 8 3 He notes that litigants are willing to improvise to adjust their
claims to the urban situation. Thus, in "dowry palaver" cases involv-
ing desertion, the husband, instead of attempting to reclaim his mar-
riage payment from the woman's kin upcountry, sues the other man.
The urban "customary" court is willing to enforce these new claims.
8 4
We have to this point dealt with only one aspect of the choice of
law process in African courts: cases arising from litigation involving
persons from two different tribes. I turn now to a second typology of
the choice of law process: cases involving a single individual where
the question is whether his situation should be governed by his tra-
ditional tribal law or by the imported "English" law which he may
be deemed to have accepted by his mode of life. This particular
choice of law problem sheds further light on the comparative roles
of customary and magistrates' courts in urban Africa.
80. Ibid. 217.
81. Ibid.
82. J. Crabb, The Legal System of Congo-Kinshasa 95 ff. (1970), based
on Pauwels, Rechtskeuze en Wording Van Een Eenvormige Stadsgewoonte in
de Inlandse Rechtbanken Te Leopoldstad (Kinshasa) 1926-1940 (1967).
83. Banton, supra note 64 at 145 (1957).
84. Ibid. 86. While governing legislation regulating the law to be applied
in customary courts is seldom, if ever, explicit with regard to the application of
newly formulated "urban customary law", there is occasionally a general
clause permitting application of "combinations" of any two or more native
laws and customs and for the application (failing the applicability of other
laws) of "the principles of natural justice, equity and good conscience." See
e.g. North-Western State of Nigeria, Area Courts Edict, 1967, § 21. Yet, by
and large, colonial and post-colonial legislation has tended to discourage the
development of a common law from customary law-particularly a common
law incorporating Western legal concepts. See Bentsi-Enchill, supra note 77
at 27-30.
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The problem arises, for example, in a situation where a couple
marries under the general Marriage Ordinance, a spouse dies, and the
court must determine whether customary or English law should apply
to the devolution of the deceased's property.
The magistrates' courts and High Courts normally phrase the
conflict as one between the English concepts embodied in the general
law and the traditional concepts embodied in the customary law. For
the rural African who, in his one fling with modernism, marries under
the Ordinance, the choice may be appropriate. But if suggestions
made earlier in this section are correct, for the urban African the
choice may actually be between three types of law: the codified gen-
eral law of English inspiration, the customary law of the individual's
tribe, and the new customary (common) law of his urban community.
The resolution of the choice of law problem in the urban customary
court might be quite different from the resolution of that problem in
the magistrates' court. While thorough empirical research is needed
to examine the "types" of "customary law" applied by professional
magistrates and urban customary courts, one would suspect that once
the decision is made that "customary law" is applicable, the magis-
trates' courts are apt to apply a more traditional and conservative
type of customary law than would be applied in the same case in an
urban customary court. This would depend, of course, largely on the
sources to which the professional magistrate turns to discover the cus-
tomary law applicable to a case. If the magistrate turns to restate-
ments of customary law based on research conducted in rural areas, or
to studies conducted by colonial officers, or to informants brought
from the tribal areas, or if the magistrate takes "judicial notice" of a
customary law applied in an earlier case, the customary law which he
applies may be much more reflective of rural values than of urban
values.
Given the nature of the judicial process in magistrates' courts, it
would appear that it is precisely to these sources that magistrates
would turn. In making such an application, the court may not only
be applying a form of law that is not entirely appropriate to the liti-
gants before the court, but may also be reinforcing a set of values and
norms which the modernizing state wishes to discourage.8 5
Of course, it may not be clear that a marriage, for example, should
be governed by a new urban law. In a relationship where rural ties
are strong, the rural law may be the most appropriate. But at least
the choice should be seen and dealt with. Again, the traditional fact-
85. See Amulan Ogwang v. Edward Ojok, M.B. 14/71 (High Court of
Uganda Civil Appeal) where the Magistrates' Court declared a marriage in-
valid where only part of a dowry was paid although installment payment is
now common in urban Uganda. See also Law Development Centre, Kampala,
Comment, 13 March 1971 (mimeographed).
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finding processes of the customary court may be more appropriate
for this inquiry because it may be of a more searching nature. Cus-
tomary courts traditionally consider a broader range of facts "relevant"
to the inquiry than do magistrates' courts which are bound by formal
rules of evidence. Accustomed to dealing with what Max Gluckman
calls "an intricate network of relationships"8 6 or what Lon Fuller calls
"polycentric problems",8 7 the customary courts would appear to be
better equipped to deal with problems of a pluralistic nature. It
would seem that only by an extended inquiry into an individual's
rural ties-perhaps inquiring into the role of the parents of each
spouse in the marriage's social or economic relationship-can a court
determine the influence of rural versus urban factors. Only through
this extensive fact-finding process, perhaps, can the court determine
whether, because of a strong influence of kinship relationships, the
law should recognize rural interests or whether, on the other hand,
the urban nexus is so strong that rural interests should not be recog-
nized.
To lawyers who consider customary law to be "tribal law" or
"primitive law" which anthropologists and misguided lawyers wish to
preserve as a "museum piece",8 8 the concept of a customary law or
court which is able to function and flourish in an urban environment
must be most uncongenial. In shifting gears to a new understanding
of customary law in the urban context, we are helped by Lon Fuller's
refreshing observations on the concept of customary law. He argues
that the phenomenon called customary law "can best be described
as a language of interaction": it originates in social interaction and
serves the purpose of organizing and facilitating interaction. 9 Thus,
not only can customary law be seen to have a social context by which
it is shaped and which it helps to shape, but it can be seen as a phe-
nomenon which is not peculiar to traditional societies. Professor Fuller
argues that one who sees only the statutory law of the United States
and ignores the unwritten "customary law" which has grown out of
interactional situations, sees a very skewed picture of American legal
systemsf 0
Assisted by these insights, the step to understanding a role for
customary law in urban Africa is not a difficult one. While the temp-
tation to adopt comprehensive family law or other legislation is strong
in a country bent on rapid modernization, the history of much of this
legislation has not been encouraging. In addition, the conflict of laws
86. Gluckman, supra note 15 at 220.
87. Fuller, "Collective Bargaining and the Arbitrator," 1963 Wis. L. Rev.
3, 18-42; Fuller, "Irrigation and Tyranny," 17 Stan. L. Rev. 1021-42 (1965).
88. See e.g. Lipton, supra note 24 at 32-33.
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approach of the magistrates' and High Courts has not served to syn-
thesize various customary laws or customary law and "English" law;
rather, the result is to emphasize distinctions. It is perhaps only
through a common-law, interactional approach that viable and inte-
grated family, property and commercial laws can be developed.
William Lewis, in a review of some of the recent literature of
urban sociology in Africa, including Fyfe and Jones' Freetown, sum-
marizes the case well:
Arguments exist in abundance for the fashioning of a unitary
system, not the least of which is the desirability of strength-
ening the notion of one people, living in one nation, sharing
one body of beliefs .... On the other hand, the inability of
modern Freetown society to provide meaningful guideposts
for social action leaves a void which only custom and tradi-
tion can fill.91
What I have said to this point about the actual and potential role
of customary courts and customary law in the urban setting relates
to what Herskovits calls the process of "reinterpretation", whereby
"sanctions and values of a given tradition under contact with another
are applied to new forms, combining and recombining until syncre-
tisms develop that rework them into meaningful, well-functioning
conventions. '9 2 But this is only part of the process which I think
makes customary courts apt judicial institutions for urban Africa.
The second part of the process is the manner in which customary
courts involve individuals in the reinterpretation process and serve as
transmitters of information with regard to the creation of new stand-
ards. In much the same way that ethnic associations serve a facili-
tating and educational role in assisting migrants to adjust to the
urban environment, so the urban customary courts may play a role
in interpreting the standards and norms they are expected to follow
in their new environment.
Anthropologists have drawn our attention to the educational, ther-
apeutic and other functions of traditional dispute-settling institutions
in the rural setting. Western legal systems, overlaid with technical
procedures and an adversary environment, tend to obscure these non-
litigious functions.
Gibbs states that the customary Kpelle "moots" of Liberia play
a therapeutic role in that "like psychotherapy, they re-educate the par-
ties through a type of social learning brought about in a specially
structured interpersonal setting.193 While the environment and process
of statutory customary courts differ to some degree from the setting
91. Lewis, supra note 33 at 63.
92. Herskovits, supra note 15 at 292.
93. Gibbs, "The Kpelle Moot: A Therapeutic Model for the Informal
Settlement of Disputes," 33 Africa 1, 6 (1963).
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described by Gibbs, they are sufficiently similar that the basic prin-
ciple of re-education applies.
Moreover, the educational and adaptive role of the urban cus-
tomary courts may extend beyond the particular parties to the litiga-
tion. As much as their rural counterparts, urban customary courts
are often a focal point of social life in the town. The Mixed Court of
the "strangers' quarters" in Zaria, for example, was always the center
of considerable attention from the local populace. Located in the very
midst of the market activity of the quarter, the Mixed Court often
seemed less a judicial institution than a social activity. People con-
stantly milled outside the court. The inside of the court was always
full during the hearing of a dispute. What the litigants, witnesses and
court members said was quickly common knowledge. Indeed, one is
struck by the similarity between the appearance and operation of the
urban customary courts in an urban center such as Zaria and the ap-
pearance and operation of customary courts in the rural areas.
In summary, then, I see a role for customary courts in Africa sim-
ilar to the role performed by voluntary associations. I return to Little's
description of urban unions and leave it to the reader to interpolate the
judicial context himself:
The voluntary association serves as an adaptive mechanism.
. . . In other words, it helps to adjust the rural migrant to his
fresh status as a townsman [and] as a member of a multi-
tribal community. . . . Further, since they help to establish
and validate fresh norms and exercise control over the per-
sonal conduct of their own members, voluntary associations
are one of the means whereby an over-all system of rela-
tionships is integrated and law and order maintained among
the town's heterogeneous population. 4
V. CONCLUSION
I have argued here for a reassessment of the role of customary
courts and customary law in the urbanization and modernization proc-
esses in Africa. Several reasons have been suggested: the extent of
rural-urban ties in Africa; the pluralistic behavior patterns of the Afri-
can townsman; the development of non-official judicial or quasi-judi-
cial institutions in urban centers as a result of felt social needs; the ap-
parent suitability of customary court processes for dealing with poly-
centric problems characteristic of an urbanizing society; and the appar-
ent viability of customary law in an urban setting. I have further
contended that customary court processes and customary law may be
94. Little, supra note 50 at 102.
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better suited to the solution of certain urban legal problems than mag-
istrates' courts, Western legal processes and statutory law.
In addition, it may be argued that, as Africans and African states
turn increasingly to a new appreciation of their cultural heritage-as
is occurring in the "rediscovery" of African history, for example-a
new appreciation of African indigenous legal institutions and proc-
esses may emerge. In the long run, the legitimacy provided by
building upon these indigenous institutions may be more important to
African states than that provided by Western models.
